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...action, speech, and thought... do not "produce",
bring forth anything, they are as futile as life itself.
In order to become worldly things, that is, deeds and facts
and events and patterns of thoughts and ideas, they must
first be seen, heard, remembered, and then transformed,
reified as it were, into things - into sayings of poetry,
the written page or the printed book, into paintings or
sculpture. . .The whole factual world of human affairs depends
for its reality and its continued existence, first, upon the
presence of others who have seen and heard and will remember,
and, second, on the transformation of the intangible into
the tangibility of things.
Hannah Arendt,
The Human Condition
INTRODUCTION
I find in myself a distinct desire to limit verbalization
and get on with the business of experiencing and producing
works of art. Part of the trouble with so much of the talk
about modern art is that it is directed at audiences which have
no experience of the actual work. . .audiences whose abilities
to apprehend through the senses were compromised sometime
during childhood.
The very requirement of the written thesis for painters
is in part a reflection of the built in assumption of the
institution and the society that discourse is the supreme
key to human behavior, and therefore all other approaches to
experience may be subordinated to the demands of discourse.
PART ONE
Paradoxically, I am simultaneously apart from others and
a part of them. Since the age of ESP has not yet arrived, I
cannot share directly in the promptings of someone else's
nervous system, and my solitude would be complete were it not
possible to communicate indirectly by using language, g.\,&o to
participate indirectly in the experience of others by feell.^.
Knowledge is paradoxical since its source, humanity, is the
source from which it is tainted. If objective knowledge is
knowledge determined solely by what is known, then objective
knowledge is impossible. Without feelings, assumptions, and
a perspective of my own I could not gain access to 5 different
set of feelings, assumptions, a different perspective; far from
knowing others objectively, I could not know them at all.
Also paradoxical, then, is the fact that the very desire
of the critic or historian to understand the territory of art
is an obstacle which prevents him from achieving his goal. No
intellectual theory system has yet been evolved which conforms
to the extended reality of art, and the tendency remains for
the writer to see the situation as containing possible solutions
to his problem; hence, in the name of criticism, history, or
anthropology, he reduces the seething mixture of contradictory
principles
(Malinowski' s definition of culture) which lies
before him to something which will fit a theory. It can be
said that art is a major way of ordering this seething mixture,
even that art is the only ordering process whose complexity
matches the complexity of what is to be ordered. Yet we are
2confronted in the operations of the writer with a set of
observations that conform to his biases and preconceptions,
not to this richness of extended human possibility.
There are two reasons why art, as distinct from dis
course, succeeds as it does: the complexity of its symbols,
and its ability to engage all sides of a human being. One
of the fundamental characteristics of art, as we normally
think of it, is its sensuousness. Into whatever reaches of
meaning and imagination the work of art finally enters, it
enters these realms by way of the senses. This preoccupation
with sensuousness not only heightens the vividness of ex
perience, it also heightens its ambiguity. We ask, what is
the art work trying to communicate? When the sensuousness
becomes embodied in symbols that point beyond their own
sensuous vibrations, then the ambiguity has a definite locus
and can be spelled out, without losing its quality of
ambiguousness. Though the cues with which we are presented
may be concrete, it is possible to read their meaning in
different, even conflicting emotional directions at the same
time with no sacrifice of coherency of meaning. The result
is a richness which can never be reduced to a paraphrase in
prose, to a language deliberately purged of ambiguity.
Because art is an enactment, a presentation rather than a
representation of experience, it is capable of this kind of
oblique and simultaneous utterance of complexities (Dorothy
Lee calls this a non-lineal codification of reality), which
may finally result in paradoxes.
3For these reasons, the work of art, if it is to be
thoroughly understood, may demand the participation of all
aspects of a person, Ihe senses echo in the emotions, the
emotions echo in intuition, intuition echoes in reflection,
and all of these reverberate through imagination, a compound
of them all.**
PART TWO
The thesis exists in a personal context as the product
of individual and collective growth. Not that we should lose
our identities, our selves, but that we should seek them, that
we should achieve an intensified awareness of where our ex
periences have led us by testing them against each other and
against the demands of producing intelligent and searching
work with collective integrity. The effort can be defined by
one word, communication. Communication with ourselves, with
each other, and finally with those who will perceive the
works in the public context of exhibition.
Our most severe limitations were the medium and the time
available. *2 The limitations of the medium lie in the fact
that large surfaces were to be covered by numerous small, hand
printed color etchings which had to be produced individually
and whose interrelations could therefore be seen only when
all the prints were finished, cut, and laid ajacent to one
another on the masonite surface. Even then our ability to
evaluate was restricted by the fact that the unattached prints
dictated viewing the work as it lay horizontally on a table
and not vertically from a proper distance. Throughout the
project we dealt with parts which we hoped would eventually
form a satisfying whole.
The encountered parts vs. whole process problem brings
to mind an issue for criticism, namely that talking about
works of art seems to be a matter of talking about parts or
5their relations - this image or passage of color against
that one. We have words for general categories which
qualify the whole, but they do not wrap up the whole and
hand it over in substitute form. When we talk about qualities
of the whole, we are only talking about aspects of the whole,
and the whole eludes its aspects as readily as it eludes its
parts. No matter how extensive the enumeration of parts and
aspects of the whole may be, it never encompasses the whole.
The process is self-defeating. The more parts and aspects we
recognize, the more numerous become the possible interrelations
among them; the more these interrelations are recognized, the
more difficult becomes the problem of synthesizing
them.*-*
We began with the idea that preplanning would be extensive,
that most of the creative aspects of the work would occur in
the platemaking, color selecting, and printing stages. Once
the prints were made, the process was to be mostly mechanical.
Attention was to be given to arranging, of course, but we were
to determine the overall design of the work in advance. Our
attitudes toward this process changed as we discovered that
previsualizing and preplanning were valuable mostly for the
purposes of making plates, selecting colors, and proofing.
By the time the second piece, "Nuristan Street", was complete
we had learned that postponing the overall layout of the
prints was not only desirable but necessary.
We had discovered empirically what various researchers
of the creative process in art have observed, that the most
successful painters continue the search aspect of the process
into the final stages of the work and rarely restrict the
search to a preplanning stage.. It is interesting to note
that much of what may be described as classical art and
most civic or public art adheres to strict formulas which
are determined prior to the actual production of the work.
This mode of working, combined with the nature of the formulas
used, is at odds with contemporary theories on creativity,
for example those which cite the unconscious as the source of
creative power (see Ehrenzweig, also D. T. Suzuki). The
contrast between what we now regard as two separate and distinct
types of thinking became institutionalized in the late nine
teenth century in the conflict between academic art and refusees
art, with the result that the contrast now seems to us to be
a contrast between the academic and art, with the result that
aspiring artists now take rebellion for granted, with the
result that an academization of rebellion has taken place.
The whole notion of the academic as applied to art has
come up so frequently during my student years that I feel it
necessary to elaborate somewhat. It seems obvious by now that
the academy, like the womb, is one of the citadels of the
human mind, a citadel which has the power to draw into its
keep even those forces of the mind which, in their own intention
at least, are bound for wide open spaces. The academy is the
equivalent of society; it was all there from the beginning.
Michelangelo is reputed to have said, "The man who follows
others will never walk first|, not sceteingto realize that to
need to walk first is to be as enslaved to those who follow as
7those who follow are enslaved to him who walks first.
Slavery to others is still slavery even if the others com
prise a vanguard or elite. The same slavery is built into
the categories which art historians use in discussing the
role aspects of artists' lives. All of them use categories
which take the group as central and describe the person in
terms of his location relative to that center. He conforms
to the center, he tries to change it, he retreats from it,
he repeats it mechanically, he rebels against it. Because
all of these processes have the same center, one is as human
a response as any of the others. The underlying assumption
is that human arrangements have but one center and this is
it. Not to be categorizable in any of these terms would be
to fall out of the human world.
This is also what is wrong with the uses of "creative".
It usually means something like I am creative because I am
not dead like those people in the Pentagon, etc. Everyone
has his favorite corpses to whip. The trouble with this is
that in preoccupying yourself with what the dead are up to,
you do not have time to find out what you, the exemplary
manifestation of the living, are up to, and this lack of time
for life is singularly close to the way in which we ordinarily
define being dead, just as the rebels, adopting the latest
fads, are indistinguishable from the academic mannikins.
All of this is so widely prevalent (though not so widely
perceived) that we may be growing ripe for the realization
that human life is not reducible to society which, from one
8viewpoint is nothing but shared consciousness. In order to
have shared consciousness, you have to have personal con
sciousness; you can't have one - at least in human form -
without the other. This means that the "human scheme" has
two centers: person and society. What we have rarely if
ever seen is an art or other activity which genuinely and
innocently stems from the person, I know the art rebels
talk incessantly about authenticity, but that too is suspect;
I suspect it of being a way of persuading themselves to capit
ulate to the citadel while keeping their capitulation secret
from themselves.
It is very human to want to be recognized by others,
human even to be unsure that you exist until someone ack
nowledges your existence. However, everything that occurs,
including things which are destroying us, is very human, so
that hardly qualifies as a standard for acceptance or rejection.
Perhaps it is time to try something inhuman, like making the
person rather than society the center of human life, or,
better still, making the human scheme central.
*^
FOOTNOTES
Parts One and Two
*Mills, George, "Art and the Anthropological Lens",
Unpublished paper, 1965. The ideas contained in part one
are summarized and adapted from this source. They are
incomplete but indicative of the kinds of issues I find
vital. Other issues not discussed would include play
theory (see Piaget, Structuralism) . and the esthetic
notion of physical distance, to mention two.
zIssues of interpersonal communication are omitted
as Rebecca deals with them.
3Mills, p. 6.
^The discussion of the implications of the Academy is
summarized from a comment by Mills on my unpublished paper
titled "Toward an Understanding of Academic Art."
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In this stillness there is no sense of passivity,
of submitting to necessity, for there is no longer any
differentiation between the mind and its experience.
All acts, one's own and others', seem to be happening
freely from a single source.
Alan Watts,
Nature, Man, and
""Woman
Divided into two parts, I create
Devi Bhagavata
INTRODUCTION
This is not a research paper. It does not have
a single hypothesis or an orderly build-up of facts,
quotations, etc. to support a single conclusion. It
is rather a presentation of 1) statements about my own
work, both concept and method, which are relevant to
the shared thesis project; 2) a brief discussion of
the role of conscious analysis and of the unconscious
in creative work; 3) a discussion of Michael's and my
methods of working together.
I do not know whether it is more valid for the
artist or the critic to talk about the artist's work.
In any case, that debate is outside the scope of this
paper. I do know that it is sometimes helpful, after
performing a certain action, to try to understand how
your head got into the particular state which is realized
in the action itself. The ideas in this paper are indica
tive of the type of reading and thinking I was doing while
working on the shared project. I consider the pieces
themselves, less self-conscious and more facile at pre
senting many modes of consciousness, to be a far more
complete demonstration of what occurred: they are at
once both event and explanation.
PART THREE
My work is based upon two main concepts which I
first began to examine three years ago while enrolled in
an Albers type color course. These are: appreciation
of subtle changes (variations, progressions) between
works of art and within a single work, and the ability
to alter a subject (motif, pattern) by changing its visual
context. Examples from so-called "primitive art" are
considered as models for the utilization of these con
cepts and serve as a major source of motif.
I am also involved with the idea of visual order
ing in the following way: it appears that our culture
and visual education stresses seeing in an orderly (bal
anced, harmonious) way . Aside from practical considera
tions (the necessity to visually order the space in a
room so that one is able to walk through it, etc.) it
seems to me that the conscious tendency to always want
to create balance and order is false and boring. However,
the eye (brain) is so programmed toward order that it
becomes almost impossible to make a surface which will
be perceived as truly tense or chaotic. Perhaps it can
be said that what I am really trying to do is to create
order on some "other level". Statements like this are to
me a quibble of semantics; what I am interested in is
examining the existing program of the eye (brain) to see
order, determining how this program can be visually dis
turbed, and finding out how much tension the eye can be
made to perceive, whether subtle or overt.
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My working procedure for the past few years has
been to divide a two dimensional surface into right and
left halves and to visually play the halves against each
other in terms of pattern, color, directional focus, etc..
As I made more and more pieces and began to comprehend
my own limits within this approach I began to wonder what
would happen if I allowed another person to do one half
of a given work. Would the factor of another "person
ality", different way of making marks and of perceiving,
etc. result in a surface which was uniquely differentiated
from what I could make, and would this differentiation
have meaning or create a kind of tension that I could not
have created myself?
Michael Harris and I did two acrylic and cloth
paintings in the winter of 1972 as an exploration of this
idea. The thesis project was developed from these paint
ings as well as Michael's solo work with large modular
etchings and our joint experiences with viscosity print
ing.
I do not follow any consciously systematic approach
in looking at works of art yet most visual art has, for
me, more than purely visual Implications. I think that
the "generalist" approach described by John Cunningham
Lilly in The Mind of the Dolphin^, where many seemingly
unrelated disciplines are used to approach a single pro
blem, is increasingly important and necessary to counter
act our (learned) tendency to deal with "things" instead
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of "relationships"; also to overcome an emphasis on
specialization which at its worst results in snobbery
and irrelevance. However, I am equally suspicious of
trying to formulate a consciously synthesized approach
from disciplines that one knows only too little about
(another consequence of specialization).
People often discuss "logical" systems in works
of art, for example. Are such people familiar with
Ayer, Russell, and other writers of modern logic? Can
their statements about painting and sculpture relate
to these authors? If not, to what do they relate3?
When this approach is escalated the most shallow results
are passed off as being terribly profound, the "herald
of the future", etc.. A case in point is Arthur Koest-
ler's The Ghost in the Machine, which at first appears
very impressive in its utilization of ideas from many
technical fields: physics, anthropology, biology, and
psychology. Koes tier's credibility wears off, however,
if one discusses his book with a person trained in the
above fields. A university professor of physics easily
demonstrated to me that Koes tier's understanding of this
subject is rather popularized and simple-minded, and not
really suitable to support his conclusions .
Some writers would say that my approach to these
problems has its own justification and "system" and that
my approach to synthesis is simply carried out by a part
of my thinking apparatus other than the rational/conscious
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area: perhaps what Anton Ehrenzweig names "unconscious
scanning"5. Really creative endeavors, Ehrenzweig main
tains, must take place in "uncharted territory" where
no prior structure for ordering exists. Thus "creative
thinking", in science as well as in art, presupposes a
mysterious capacity for "operating precisely within impre
cise structures"^, yet such an operation is beyond the
scope of the conscious mind simply because the area of
concern is unexplored and there are too many alternative
courses of action: it would take years for the conscious
mind to examine them all, Ehrenzweig concludes that
"conscious visualization can only deal with one alterna
tive at a time. Hence he the subject3 must rely on
unconscious intuition for scanning these many possibili
ties"7.
Alan Watts has written similarly in his discussion
in Nature. Man and Woman of the role of the mind (con
scious, linear) vs. the brain (unconscious, simutan-
eously multi- level) in human thought. He states that:
The notion that the interrelatedness of nature
is complex and highly detailed is merely the
result of translating it into linear units of
thought. Despite its rigor and despite its
initial success, this is an extremely clumsy
mode of intelligence. Just as it is a highly
complicated task to drink water with a fork
instead of a glass, so the complexity of nature
is not innate but a result of the instruments
used to handle it.... The circulation of the
blood becomes complex only when understood in
physiological terms, that is, when understood
by means of a conceptual model constructed of
the kind of simple units which conscious atten*
tion requires".
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While Watts approaches this problem as a student of
Eastern thought and a critic of Western civilization,
many other writers on art have expressed their regret
that Western education stresses conscious analytical
thought at the expense of non- linear and non-verbal
modes". I personally have been horrified by the num
ber of art students and teachers I encounter who do not
really use their eyes, who categorize all work in terms
of "pigeon-holes", or who, when confronted with a work of
art, merely parrot phrases they have read or heard.
My personal preference for visual art is that it
operate on many levels: a sensual level, the "what
you see is what you get" level calling to mind Frank
Stella's statement that it is very worthwhile simply
to make "something worth looking at"10; also various
meta-visual levels: conscious, symbolic, whatever. It
is the involvement with, the balancing of, and the com
munication about these various levels that seems to be
critical when I try to think about what happened when
Michael and I made the thesis pieces. There seems to be
a trend: a beginning emphasis on analysis and overall
plan gave way to attention to the unique qualities of
each piece and willingness to deviate from plan (precon
ception) with regard to how we thought the piece should
look.
If the thesis work has not been about communication
19
it has not been about anything. John Lilly has written
on this subject that
Our relatively large minds (brains) act as com
puters than can make models inside themselves of
other human minds and their activities. Each of
us knows that we construct models of other people:
one has a model of his wife in his head; she in
turn has a model of her husband in hers.... The
model of the wife must change in the husband as
the wife changes and grows; the model of the hus
band in the wife must change as the real person
changes. Otherwise there is a severe breakdown
of communication.
Thus shared work involved development and alteration of
models, both concerning the making of the prints themselves
and concerning the two persons involved.
In the beginning of the project, the notion of having
an idea or a specific intention for each piece was for
me very much associated with the idea of planning the
work. I had reached the end of a long phase of experi
mentation with the prints I was doing by myself and hoped
for a more specific clarity of purpose with the thesis.
Consequently the act of pre-visualizing (planning) each
piece and following initial intentions strictly was much
more important for me than for Michael, who argued that
once we made and laid out the prints the results would
surprise us so much that extensive planning would be
wasted time. In almost every case he proved right and
the more pieces we did, the more surprised I was; the
result being that in various ways we altered our initial
methods of pre-visualization.
Certain plans were abandoned as they proved to be
20
unworkable: that is, they were shown to be more precon
ceptions than plans. Most of these had to do with transi
tions from doing normal prints to the large works: color
and spatial divisions simply functioned differently. The
center split which I had favored in my own etchings and
which was intimate and book- like in small prints seemed
stiff and arbitrary in the large pieces, possibly because
they were so horizontal that it became difficult to easily
view both halves simultaneously and thus unite the work
by way of the perceptual process. We experimented both
with more interlocking configurations ("Birgit", "M. F.
A. Deco", "Am Tier") and with distorting the center divis
ion by superimposing another system ("Nuristan Street")
to find spatial arrangements which worked better on the
large scale.
In the beginning we made detailed drawings of each
piece before plates were ever made; this gave way to a
very open agreement upon an idea for each piece such as
"grid" or "aquatint with bars of colored paper". For
the final pieces we merely designated existing plates
(often very worked-over plates made previously to the
thesis) and chose colors. It might be said that con
scious abstract intentions were replaced by a non-verbally
expressed (although agreed upon) intention, the character
of which was actually more visually specific (the existing
plates had been previously printed many times and we knew
their characteristics).
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The primary shortcoming of an experimental approach
was that because there was no specific conceptual idea
there was also no heirarchy of values by which to con
ceptually judge or even verbally deal with the pieces
(it is hard to decide if you are getting better or worse
if you don' t know what you are attempting to get better
at). The fact that looking at the pieces was a rather
unique visual experience only added to the problem: not
only did we not have clearly expressable intentions con
cerning what we wanted; the pieces didn't really relate
to anything in our previous visual experience. How could
we reach decisions about them?
This problem was somewhat alleviated (or avoided)
by the fact that Michael ari I seemed to have different
areas of strongest concern and were willing to follow the
other person's wishes where each of us did not have an
especially fixed opinion. Framing, for example, seemed
to be very important to Michael but did not really interest
me in relation to other problems so I elected to follow
his decisions about the frames in most cases.
It was very important for me to create a modified
"field effect" in the pieces so that the glued prints
would be seen not as a unit repetition (as in Warhol's
Marilyn Monroe silkscreens) but rather as a single fluid
mass shifting slightly in color, density, etc.. Michael
agreed with this in principle but we usually disagreed
on printing methods; he wanted to make what I considered
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great variations between the prints while I felt that
even if we attempted to make all the prints look alike
they would, once set against each other, look quite dif
ferent enough (the Albers idea of interaction through
contrast at the border). Michael's approach seems to
have worked out best in "Birgit", where the strong linear
feeling that his prints are "woven" together counteracts
the tendency of color variation to make the piece look
fragmented. "Ragland", "Yojimbe", and "M. F. A. Deco"
are closer to my ideas of execution.
Gradually Michael and I developed a respect for each
other's speed of decision-making and learned to resist
yelling "I told you so" when, for example, either of us
took an hour to reach some conclusion which the other
had made in five minutes. Since our ultimate aim was not
to control each other but to let a free interaction of
our separate personalities occur, overtly egoistic traits
in both of us had to be recognized and controlled whenever
possible. Michael and I have very different artistic
backgrounds (art history, Western art oriented versus
design school, technical, Eastern and primitive oriented)
and even if we often had the same or similar ideas I felt
that we reached them by vastly different paths. This
presented a communications barrier although it was altered
somewhat by the common experiences of our shared project.
I'm not sure that we ever developed communication very
much on a verbal level (Michael's questions of "Does the
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piece imply infinity? How can the arrangement be made
more consistent with the implication of infinity?" remained
as irritating to me at the end of the project as at the
beginning; vice vera my customary wordlessness); however,
in some unconscious way we definitely grew to be more in
tune with each other.
A confirmation of this, for me, was our decision to
reprint half of "M.F.A. Deco". What this meant was that
by the time we executed this piece (the fifth piece to be
printed) we were enough in agreement on some level about
what the piece should look like (or even that it should
look a certain way) that we felt justified in undertaking
a large amount of work to correct an unsatisfactory initial
result. This led to fuller mutual expressions of feel
ings of disappointment we had about earlier pieces (more
honesty about our opinions) and additional supplementary
printing. Although we had abandoned our initial ideas
about planning, we had clearly progressed beyond the purely
experimental stage of "making a piece, seeing what it looked
like, and moving on to a new piece".
In some ways we retained the use of overall systems
and in some ways not; generally, we moved toward approach
ing pieces on a more and more individual basis: trying
to determine the border shape, format, etc. which each
separate set of prints "wanted". We grew to have common
feelings about the kind of pieces we wanted to make with
out either of us aggressively asserting our personal
24
desires, and we came to mutually understand what steps
would be necessary to achieve a given intention.
If one facet of the work was neglected, it was
the technical question of permanence. The methods of
gluing, etc. that were used were advantageous in terms
of flatness, evenness of the glue coat, and holding
strength. Their long term effect upon handmade paper
is unknown to us. I hope that when we attempt similar
works in the future we will be able to experiment with
more traditional methods of affixing printing paper,
or at least obtain information about the long term effects
of the more commercial glues and their solvents.
FOOTNOTES
Part Three
See Education of Vision, Gyorgy Kepes, ed.
(New York: George BrazilTer, 1965) for examples of
this type of thinking from many authors.
2Lilly, John, The Mind of the Dolphin (New York:
Avon Books, 1967), pp.~T5-WT
3Leon N. Cooper, conversation held at Brown
University (Providence, Rhode Island) in April, 1972,
concerning Koes tier's use of the second law of thermo
dynamics as a basis for his ideas about evolution.
^Lippard, Lucy R. , Changing (New York: E. P.
Dutton and Company, Inc., 1071), p. 25.
^Ehrenzweig, Anton, "Conscious Planning and
Unconscious Scanning", Education of Vision, op. cit. ,
p. 27.
"Ibid. , p. 28. The most-discussed example
from scientific disciplines is Albert Einstein.
'ibid., p. 28. I tend to think about this in
less broad terms than does Ehrenzweig. I believe that
historical/psychological circumstances reduce the possi
bilities from the number that "it would take years to
examine" to, say, five or ten. See Leon Cooper's
discussion of Einstein's formulation of the theory of
relativity in Cooper, Leon N. , An Introduction to the
Meaning and Structure of Physics (New Vork: itarper and
Row, 1968), chapter 30.
^Watts, Alan, Nature, Man and Woman (New York:
Random House, 1970), p. 62.
9See Arnheim, Rudolf, "Visual Thinking",
Education of Vision, op. cit. , pp. 1-15.
l^Glaser, Bruce, "Questions to Stella and Judd",
Minimal Art: A Critical Anthology, Gregory Battcock, ed.
(New Yorlcr"E.~P. Dutton and Company, Inc., 1968), p. 158,
^Lilly, John, o. cit. , pp. 20-21.
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